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Chilling Social Media
WARRANTLESS BORDER SEARCHES OF SOCIAL
MEDIA ACCOUNTS INFRINGE UPON THE FREEDOM
OF ASSOCIATION AND THE FREEDOM TO BE
ANONYMOUS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Atanu Das†
INTRODUCTION
In its landmark case, NAACP v. Alabama, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a person has the freedom of association
under the First Amendment.1 That is, a person can associate with
any group without government interference, intrusion, or
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. I; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
460–61 (1958) (“Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more
than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech
and assembl . . . Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by
association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action
which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest
scrutiny.”); Anita L. Allen, Associational Privacy and the First Amendment: NAACP v.
Alabama, Privacy and Data Protection, ALA. C. R. & C. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (“When
Americans voluntarily join a private peaceful political, religious, or social association,
even an unpopular, controversial one, they are entitled to as much confidentiality as to
their names and addresses as the association chooses to confer. The Court ruled that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers to each individual the rights
of free speech and free association. These are rights protected from federal violation by
the First Amendment and from state violation by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.”) (footnote omitted); Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in
a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L.
REV. 741, 786 (2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court recognized that a government-mandated
disclosure of group membership could be an unconstitutional infringement on the right
of association.”); Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of Association:
Data Protection vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1386 (2012) (stating “the
Court held that the State of Alabama could not compel the NAACP to disclose its
membership lists” to the state).
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intimidation.2 This freedom was promulgated from the freedom of
speech and the freedom of assembly under the First Amendment.3
Specifically, the Court has held that ideas expressed through free
speech are amplified when brought forth by a group through free
assembly that share such ideas.4 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that a person has the freedom to be anonymous under the
First Amendment;5 that is, a person can express creative, political,
or commercial speech anonymously.6 The reasons for remaining
anonymous include economic or political motives, including fear of
retaliation from both the government and private entities, such as
employers, rival political parties, and more.7 Consequently, both
the freedom of association and the freedom to be anonymous are
touchstones for the foundation of U.S democracy, which includes
the ability to engage in political discourse.8
With the advent of the internet and social media, people are
organizing themselves into social media groups that share similar
political ideas in order to amplify their political speech.9 Due to the
2 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462 (“Inviolability of privacy in group association may
in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association,
particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs”); Strandburg, supra note 1, at 787.
Swire, supra note 1, at 1386.
3 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460–61; see Allen, supra note 1, at 7; Strandburg, supra
note 1, at 786–87; Swire, supra note 1, at 1386.
4 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000) (“[W]e observed that
‘implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment’ is ‘a
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political,
social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.’” (quoting Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468, U.S. 609, 622 (1984))).
5 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (“It thus
exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in
particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from
suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.”); Jason A. Martin and Anthony L.
Fargo, Anonymity as a Legal Right: Where and Why It Matters, 16 N.C. J. L. & TECH.
311, 330 (2015); A. Michael Froomkin, Lessons Learned Too Well: Anonymity in a Time
of Surveillance, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 95, 149 (2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court made it clear that
there is a sweeping constitutional right to anonymous religious and political speech.”).
6 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
166 (2002) (“[R]equiring a permit [not to be anonymous] as a prior condition on the
exercise of the right to speak imposes an objective burden on some speech of citizens
holding religious or patriotic views.”).
7 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357; Martin & Fargo, supra note 5, at 372;
Froomkin, supra note 5, at 149.
8 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460–61; Allen, supra note 1,
at 7; Froomkin, supra note 5, 149; Martin & Fargo, supra note 5, at 330, 372; Strandburg,
supra note 1, at 786; Swire, supra note 1, at 1386.
9 Swire, supra note 1, at 1373 (“At Internet conferences that I have attended in
the past few years, there have often been panels highlighting how social networks mobilize
political change. Speakers on these panels often discussed the 2011 ‘Arab Spring,’ including
the ‘Facebook Revolution’ in Egypt that resulted in the overthrow of President Mubarak.
They also praised the 2008 Obama campaign, whose outreach and mobilization was led by
a co-founder of Facebook. In these panels, a key feature of social networks was their ability
to foster political association at the grassroots level—sharing information among activists
empowered them.” (footnotes omitted)); Strandburg, supra note 1, at 745 (“Digital
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nature of social media, many people can be subjected to harassment
for their opinions and therefore feel compelled to express creative,
commercial, or political ideas anonymously, enabling them to speak
honestly and passionately without fear from economic or political
reprisal.10 Thus, any government intrusion upon the freedom of
association and the freedom to be anonymous must be viewed with
a most critical lens so it does not inhibit people from organizing into
social media groups or hiding their identity, which could ultimately
chill their political speech on social media.11
The need to express and protect one’s opinions
electronically—whether anonymously or not—has recently become
a contentious political and legal issue in a surprising setting. Since
the inauguration of the Trump administration, the U.S.
government has made border security a priority.12 Border security
technology has transformed the ways in which civic and political associations are formed
and operate. Nearly every organization now uses email, websites, and cellular phones as
primarymeans of communications withmembers. Meanwhile, more andmore political and
civic ‘work’ in society is performed not by traditionally organized, relatively long-lived, face-
to-face associations with well-defined members, leaders, policies, and goals, but by
decentralized, often transient, networks of individuals associating only or primarily
electronically and with policies and goals defined synergistically with the formation of the
emergent association itself.” (footnote omitted)).
10 Bethany C. Stein, Comment, A Bland Interpretation: Why a Facebook “Like”
Should Be Protected First Amendment Speech, 44 SETONHALL L. REV. 1255, 1257 (2014)
(“[D]uring a sheriff election, employees of the sheriff ’ s department ‘liked’ one of the
candidate’s Facebook page. That candidate lost the election, and when the new sheriff
took office he fired the employees who had ‘liked’ his opponent’s Facebook page. The
District Court held that ‘liking’ a Facebook page is not speech that warrants
constitutional protection. On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit found that ‘liking’ a political candidate’s Facebook page is speech
deserving of First Amendment protection.” (footnotes omitted)); Amna Toor, Note, “Our
Identity Is Often What’s Triggering Surveillance”: How Government Surveillance of
#BLACKLIVESMATTER Violates the First Amendment Freedom of Association, 44
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 286, 290-91 (2018) (“Amid the tense political
environment, reports have made their way into the public eye revealing that the
Department of Homeland Security (‘DHS’), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (‘FBI’),
and local law enforcement have been conducting surveillance across social media
platforms to gather information on #BlackLivesMatter protests and individual activists,
and tracking the BLM Movement since 2014. . . Justice Brennan recognized the
importance of preserving the right to freely engage in discussion without fear of
censorship [so as to prevent government resentment, hate and instability].” (footnotes
omitted)); Maeve Duggan, Online Harassment 2017 PEW RES. CTR. (July 11, 2017),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/07/11/online-harassment-2017/
[https://perma.cc/8U3F-Q3PZ].
11 See Swire, supra note 1, at 1373; Strandburg, supra note 1, at 745; Stein,
supra note 10, at 1257; Toor, supra note 10, at 290–91.
12 S.M., Donald Trump’s Travel Ban Heads Back to the Supreme Court, ECONOMIST
(Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2018/01/travelling-ban
[https://perma.cc/7P3E-QS3D];PresidentDonald J. TrumpWants to Fully SecureOurBorder and
Reform Our Immigration System to Put America First, WHITEHOUSE (May 16, 2019), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-wants-to-fully-secure-our-
border-and-reform-our-immigration-system-to-put-america-first/ [https://perma.cc/DLX9-AP7B];
Miriam Jordan, Family Separation May Have Hit Thousands More Migrant Children Than
Reported, N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/us/family-separation-
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has different connotations in this administration; the prevalent
policy seeks to prevent illegal immigrants, who are searching for a
better way of life, from entering the country. Alternatively, a less
publicized, but as important policy for border security, includes
blocking terrorists from entering the country.13 A terrorist can be
defined as a person having an ideology that includes committing
violence against a nation or its civilians for a political cause.14 The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has instituted rules that
allow Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) officials to search the
mobile device data of a person entering the country, including his
or her social media content, which could potentially provide insight
on whether the person has a terrorist ideology.15
DHS justifies these rules by invoking the border search
exception doctrine to the Fourth Amendment. The border search
exception doctrine states that a government official or law
enforcement officer can conduct a search, without a warrant, of
a person and their belongings when entering the United States
at the border.16 The border search exception doctrine views the
border or point of entry (i.e., airport, ship dock, etc.) to a country
as a vulnerable place for both the sovereignty of the nation and
the privacy interest of a person.17 The underlying rationale of the
trump-administration-migrants.html [https://perma.cc/56AS-QG39] (“The family separations
[policy was] a key part of the Trump administration’s effort to deter migrant families from trying
to enter the country at the Southwest border.”).
13 LawrenceHurley,SupremeCourt to Decide Legality of TrumpTravel Ban, REUTERS
(Jan. 19, 2018, 2:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-immigration/supreme-
court-to-decide-legality-of-trump-travel-ban-idUSKBN1F82EY [https://perma.cc/V4CM-DAM9]
(statingthat the travelwasonewaytheU.S. governmenthopedtosecure theborder fromterrorists
masquerading as refugees to do harmagainst theUnites States).
14 See Roberto Iraola, Terrorism, the Border, and the Fourth Amendment, 2003
FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 20 (2003) (“The border exception to the Fourth Amendment provides
the government with the necessary flexibility to detain and search persons and goods in its
endeavor to protect the mainland and its citizens against acts of terrorism”); What We
Investigate, FBI, https//www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism [https://perma.cc/LC39-MMYQ];
Das, infra note 20, at 210.
15 Inspection of Electronic Devices, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://
www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/inspection-electronic-devices-tearsheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4D4P-3TTZ]. See Amended Complaint, infra note 20, at 28 and 34.
16 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (“Boarder searches then,
from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, have been considered to be
‘reasonable’ by the single fact that the person or item in question had entered into our
country from the outside.”); see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global
Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 319 (2015) (“Under the narrow approach, the border
search exception exists to allow the government to keep out items that should be outside
the United States . . . . The underlying right is to control what enters . . . the country.”).
17 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925); see also Thomas
Mann Miller, Digital Border Searches After Riley v. California, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1943,
1996 (2015) (stating that an individual’s privacy interest in their digital data content
needs to be balanced with the traditional government interest of preventing people
without a legal right to enter the United States from crossing the border and preventing
contraband from entering the country); see also Kerr, supra note 16, at 294–95 (“The
Supreme Court has held that a border search exception to the Fourth Amendment
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border search exception is that it is reasonable to search a
person and the person’s belongings, without a warrant, for the
purposes of determining whether the person has a right to enter
the country or whether the person is carrying any contraband.18
No further search is within the scope of the border search
exception because not only is the country vulnerable from people
attempting to illegally enter the country or carry contraband,
but also an individual’s privacy interests and constitutional
rights are assailable as they may be violated for any number of
significant or fickle reasons by border security officials.19 With
these rules, this essay argues that DHS callously intrudes upon
the constitutionally protected freedom of association and
freedom of anonymity by invoking the border search exception
doctrine to search a U.S citizen’s social media accessible through
their mobile phone without a warrant when the citizen reenters
the United States, thereby chilling the political speech provided
by the freedoms of association and anonymity.20
applies to property entering and exiting the United States at the border, as well as its
functional equivalent, in order to protect the sovereign interests of the United States in
monitoring what enters and exits the country.” (footnotes omitted)).
18 See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153–54; see also Kerr, supra note 16, at 294–95.
19 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 552 (1985) (Brennan,
J. dissenting) (“[The Fourth Amendment] is, or should be, an important working part of
our machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to check the ‘well-
intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive officers’ who are a part of any system
of law enforcement” (citing United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S., 297,
315 (1972))).
20 Amended Complaint at 2–3, Alasaad v. Duke, No. 1:17-CV-11730-DJC (D.
Mass. Sept. 13, 2017), ECF No. 7 (“CBP and ICE have searched the mobile electronic
devices of tens of thousands of individuals, and the frequency of such searches has been
increasing. While border officers conduct some searches manually, they conduct other
searches with increasingly powerful and readily available forensic tools, which amplify
the intrusiveness and comprehensiveness of the searches. The effect of searches of mobile
electronic devices on individual privacy and expression can hardly be overstated.
Travelers’ electronic devices contain massive amounts of personal information, including
messages to loved ones, private photographs of family members, opinions and expressive
material, and sensitive medical, legal, and financial information. The volume and detail
of personal data contained on these devices provides a comprehensive picture of
travelers’ private lives, making mobile electronic devices unlike luggage or other items
that travelers bring across the border.”); Emanuella Grinberg & Jay Croft, American
NASA Scientist Says His Work Phone Was Seized at Airport, CNN (Feb. 15, 2017, 5:57
PM ET), http://www.cnn.com/2017/ 02/13/us/citizen-nasa-engineer-detained-at-bordert-
rnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/56RU-HVB4] (“Facing the risk of detention and seizure
of his phone [Bikkannavar] turned it over along with the PIN. He waited in a holding
area with other detainees until CBP officers returned his phone and released him.”);
Inspection of Electronic Devices, supra note 15 (“All persons, baggage, and merchandise
arriving in, or departing from, the United States are subject to inspection, search and
detention. This is because CBP officers must determine the identity and citizenship of
all persons seeking entry into the United States, determine the admissibility of foreign
nationals, and deter the entry of possible terrorists, terrorist weapons, controlled
substances, and a wide variety of other prohibited and restricted items. . . You’re
receiving this sheet because your electronic device(s) has been detained for further
examination, which may include copying.”); see Atanu Das, Crossing the Line
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DHS rules unconstitutionally expand the border search
exception doctrine from more than simply ascertaining whether
a person can legally enter the United States and whether the
person carries contraband, to include a search of their social
media content to determine their personal ideology.21 This allows
DHS personnel to determine whether the person is a terrorist in
the name of national security.22 Further, DHS personnel can
justify the search of social media content by interpreting
language of case law pertaining to border searches broadly with
respect to the border search exception doctrine23 to give CBP
officials a wide scope to conduct a warrantless border search of
a person and their belongings.24 Once this unbridled authority is
more well-known, it has the potential to chill social media
political speech made by those most likely targeted as terrorists
by CBP officials. DHS, however, have wrongly broadened the
scope of the border search exception doctrine.25
Some courts and scholars have been reluctant to exercise
any limit to warrantless border searches of data accessible from
mobile devices based on the border search exception doctrine
under the Fourth Amendment.26 Rather, as this essay argues,
framing warrantless border searches of mobile device data as a
Department of Homeland Security Unconstitutional Border Search of Mobile Device
Data, 22 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 205, 211 (2019); see also U.S. CONST. amend IV.
21 Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 28, 34. See Iraola, supra note 14, at
6–9; Inspection of Electronic Devices, supra note 15.
22 See Iraola, supra note 14; see also Inspection of Electronic Devices, supra note 15.
23 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, § 10.5(a) (5th ed. 2017) (“Any person or thing coming into the United States
is subject to search by that fact alone, whether or not there be any suspicion of illegality
directed to the particular person or thing to be searched” (quoting United States v.
Odland, 502 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir. 1974))); see Inspection of Electronic Devices, supra
note 15.
24 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 970 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(holding that digital data content on Cotterman’s computer can be lawfully searched
without a warrant based on reasonable suspicion); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501,
505 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that the digital data content on Ickes’s computer can be
lawfully searched without a warrant based on reasonable suspicion); United States v.
Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 570–71 (D. Md. 2014) (holding that the digital data
content on Saboonchi’s computer can be lawfully searched without a warrant based on
reasonable suspicion); see also LAFAVE, supra note 23, § 10.5(a).
25 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977) (finding that
some border searches are “particularly offensive” such that there are limits to the scope
of border search exception doctrine); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967);
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (holding that search of data accessible
from a mobile device requires a warrant even in situations the mobile device was seized
under an exception to the warrant requirement, namely the search incident to arrest
exception in this case); Das, supra note 20, at 207.
26 Ramsey, 431 U. S. at n.13; Eunice Park, The Elephant in the Room: What Is
a “Nonroutine” Border Search, Anyway? Digital Device Searches Post-Riley, 44 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 277, 314 (2017) (“[T]his Article urges that such a [reasonable suspicion]
standard provides the balance that is needed between the critical interests of both law
enforcement and the private individual.”); Miller, supra note 17, at 1996.
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government intrusion upon the freedoms of association and
anonymity can be an effective way to constitutionally shield
social media content from the CBP officials’ prying eyes.27
By discussing the principles of U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding the freedom of association and the
freedom to be anonymous, this essay argues that due to social
media groups having constitutional protection under the freedom
of association and the freedom of anonymity, warrantless border
searches of social media accounts do not meet strict scrutiny.
Indeed, these warrantless border searches of electronic data are
not narrowly tailored to protect the compelling government
interest of national security, thereby unconstitutionally chilling
political speech on social media.28
This essay proceeds in the following six parts. Part I
outlines a real-life example of the DHS and CBP officials applying
the border search exception doctrine to search the contents of a
U.S. citizen’s mobile phone data. Part II discusses significant
Fourth Amendment case law and the border search exception
doctrine jurisprudence. Part III and Part IV describe the case law
for the freedom of association and the freedom to be anonymous,
respectively. Part V applies the freedom of association and freedom
to be anonymous to social media. Lastly, Part VI synthesizes these
ideas to demonstrate that warrantless border searches of social
media infringes upon the freedoms of association and anonymity
by chilling political speech.
I. A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF AU.S. CITIZEN’SMOBILE
DEVICEDATA BY AIRPORT BORDER SECURITY
Early in 2017, a thirty-five-year-old U.S.-born citizen Sidd
Bikkannavar was stopped by CBP officials at Houston’s George
Bush Intercontinental Airport while returning to his home in the
U.S. from abroad.29 As he was proceeding through immigration
review, CBP officials demanded to search the data accessible from
his mobile phone.30 His first reaction was to refuse because he was
a scientist for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration’s (NASA) Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena,
27 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958);
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347; Strandburg, supra note 1, at 748; Swire, supra note 1, at 1395–96.
28 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460–61; McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347; Strandburg, supra
note 1, at 748; Swire, supra note 1, at 1374.
29 Grinberg and Croft, supra note 20. Das, supra note 20, at 211.
30 Kaveh Waddell, A NASA Engineer Was Required to Unlock His Phone at the
Border (2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/02/anasaengineeris
requiredtounlockhisphoneattheborder/516489/ [https://perma.cc/29VQ-KH43]; Das, supra
note 20, at 211.
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California,31 and confidential information was accessible from his
mobile phone.32 However, CBP officials gave him an ultimatum to
either comply with their demands or have his mobile phone seized
until he consented to the search, resulting in Bikkannavar
relenting and consenting to the search.33
After this ordeal, Bikkannavar revealed that CBP officials
gave him a document titled “Inspection of Electronic Devices”
providing justification that the CBP had the right to search the
data accessible from his mobile phone.34 Further, the document
stated that a search of this data was mandatory and failure to
allow the CBP to do so can result in seizure of the mobile phone.35
The document revealed that a purpose of the warrantless border
search of data accessible from a mobile phone was to identify
terrorists or to deter terrorist from entering the United States.36
Bikkannavar’s shock was compounded by the fact he had
gone through two background checks by the government to
determine whether he was a national security risk.37 First, he had
gone through a thorough background check as a government
employee so that he could access confidential information.38
Second, he applied and was approved for the CPB Protection
Global Entry program that expedites his entry in the U.S.39
Neither previous vetting process mattered to CBP officials, as
they brow-beat him to consent to a warrantless search of the data
accessible from his mobile phone.40
Bikkannavar suspected that CBP officials searched his
social media as part of their search of his mobile phone. In the fall
of 2017, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued the DHS
on behalf of Bikkannavar and several co-plaintiffs in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to find that
the a warrantless border search of mobile device data is
unconstitutional in view of both the First Amendment and the
Fourth Amendment.41 Neither the plaintiffs nor the ACLU claimed
that the warrantless border search of mobile device data included
a search of social media as an unconstitutional government
intrusion of the freedom of association and the freedom to be
31 Waddell, supra note at 30. Das, supra note 20, at 211.
32 Waddell, supra note at 30.Das, supra note 20, at 211.
33 Grinberg and Croft, supra note 20. Das, supra note 20, at 211
34 Waddell, supra note 30. See Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 23.Das,
supra note 20, at 212.
35 Waddell, supra note 30. Das, supra note 20, at 212.
36 Inspection of Electronic Devices, supra note 15. Das, supra note 20, at 212.
37 Waddell, supra note 30; Das, supra note 20, at 212.
38 Waddell, supra note 30; Das, supra note 20, at 212.
39 Waddell, supra note 30. Das, supra note 20, at 212.
40 Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 23; Das, supra note 20, at 212.
41 Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 39–40. Das, supra note 20, at 212.
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anonymous.42 Instead, the First Amendment concerns of the
plaintiffs were an infringement of freedom of association generally
in that there would be a chilling of their friendships and
acquaintances due to warrantless border searches of their mobile
device data. An amicus brief was filed that also advocated that the
warrantless border search of mobile device data infringed upon the
freedom of association generally as well as chilling of the freedom
of the press.43 The plaintiffs’ complaint and the amicus brief did not
discuss in any detail that the access to social media accounts
through the searched mobile devices infringed on the freedom of
association or freedom to be anonymous resulting in a chilling of
political speech on social media.44 If the plaintiffs did make such a
claim, the court would likely hold that it does infringe upon these
First Amendment rights.45 If the court were to reach such a
decision, Bikkannavar or anyone aware of such warrantless border
searches of mobile device data would be chilled to express their
political or religious beliefs on social media for fear of political
retribution from the government.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE BORDER SEARCH
EXCEPTIONDOCTRINE JURISPRUDENCE
Prior to understanding the effect of warrantless border
searches of mobile device data on the freedom of association and
freedom to be anonymous on social media, it is imperative to
understand the underpinning of privacy interests of the Fourth
Amendment and the border search exception. The Fourth
Amendment protects people from unreasonable search and seizures
fromgovernment law enforcement officers that is guided by the legal
principle of a person having a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The border search exception doctrine balances the
sovereign’s interest to protect the nation from unlawful entry of
people and contraband with a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy from searches of their person and belongings.46 To that
extent, the border search exception doctrine applies to both United
42 See id.
43 Brief of the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University and
the Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at
4-6, Alasaad v. Duke, No. 1:17-CV-11730 (D. Mass. Feb. 2, 2018), ECF No. 26.
44 See id.; see alsoAmendedComplaint, supranote 20.At this time, theDistrictCourt
ofMassachusetts ruled to deny themotion to dismiss the complaint filed byDHS.Memorandum
and Order, Alasaad v. Duke, No. 1:17-CV-11730-DJC (D. Mass. May 9, 2018), ECFNo. 34.
45 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Com’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995);
Strandburg, supra note 1, at 748; Swire, supra note 1.
46 SeeKatz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); Kerr, supra note 16, at 319; Das, supra note 20, at 212.
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States citizens and non-citizens alike. There is some confusion,
however, among courts and scholars on whether certain
constitutional rights apply to non-citizens. Courts and scholars
have come to some consensus that non-citizens may have some
constitutional rights if they have some foundational connection to
theUnited States such as residency or a loved one who is a resident
or citizen. In contrast, a foreign national who hold a United States
visa while visiting the country may have fewer constitutional
rights. This essay discusses the effect of the border search
exception doctrine on U.S. citizens to simplify the legal analysis.
A. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
A cornerstone Supreme Court case in the twentieth century
regarding the Fourth Amendment is Olmstead v. United States.47
Although the court’s holding was overruled decades later, it is a
historical, touchstone case to understand modern Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.48 Former President and Chief Justice
WilliamHowardTaft authoredOlmstead, and in this case, theCourt
had to decide whether a warrantless wiretapping of Roy Olmstead
violated the Fourth Amendment.49 Law enforcement officers
warrantlessly wiretapped Olmstead’s office telephones as well as
warrantlessly wiretapped his home telephone from the street.50 Law
enforcement officers did not trespass either Olmstead’s office or
residence to warrantlessly wiretap the telephones.51 Consequently,
the information collected by law enforcement officers was used to
convict Olmstead and his colleagues.52
Chief Justice Taft’s analysis from previous Fourth
Amendment cases included a trespass doctrine connected to the
Fourth Amendment, which protects “material things—the person,
the house, his papers, or his effects” because its text states “the
warrant . . . must specify the place to be searched and the person or
things to be seized.”53 Further, Chief Justice Taft stated that
although the technology of the telephone extended communications
such that two people can talk to each over a great distance,54 the
Fourth Amendment rights cannot be expanded to protect telephone
communications.55 In addition, Chief Justice Taft construed that
47 See Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 468 (1928); Das, supra note 20, at 213.
48 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353; Das, supra note 20, at 213.
49 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456–57; Das, supra note 20, at 213.
50 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 457; Das, supra note 20, at 213.
51 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 457; Das, supra note 20, at 213.
52 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455–56. Das, supra note 20, at 213.
53 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Das, supra note 20, at 213.
54 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465; Das, supra note 20, at 213.
55 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465; Das, supra note 20, at 213.
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“intervening wires” of telephone technology are not part of
Olmstead’s home or office, “any more than are the highways along
which they are stretched.”56 Therefore, the Court found that “the
wiretapping here disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,” which comported
with the established trespass doctrine.57
Olmstead established the legal foundation that the
Fourth Amendment constitutionally protected a person’s place
and possessions, but not his intangible voice conversations over
the telephone.58 Olmstead’s narrow holding surprised modern
day jurists, which argue that the Fourth Amendment provides
broader privacy protections.59
Expectedly, the Supreme Court broadened the narrow
Olmstead holding in subsequent cases and,60 almost forty years
afterOlmstead, the Court cured its deficiencies in Katz v. United
States.61 Charles Katz was found guilty of violating gaming laws
when he gathered betting information over a telephone located
in a phone booth in Los Angeles.62 FBI agents warrantlessly
wiretapped the phone booth to record Katz’s various telephone
conversations and63 these recordings were used to convict him.64
Justice Potter Stewart, in his majority opinion, found that
“the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so
eroded . . . [inwhich] . . . the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can
no longer be regarded as controlling.”65 He found that the recordings
“violated the privacy uponwhich [Katz] justifiably reliedwhile using
the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”66 Further, Justice
Stewart found that “[t]he fact that the electronic device employed to
56 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465; Das, supra note 20, at 213.
57 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466; Das, supra note 20, at 213.
58 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466; Das, supra note 20, at 213.
59 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 361; Katz, 389 U.S. at 370 (Katz sets the stage for modern
FourthAmendment jurisprudence finding that “[t]o support its new interpretation of theFourth
Amendment, which in effect amounts to a rewriting of the language of the Court’s opinion
concludes that ‘the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been eroded by our
subsequent decisions.’”); see LAFAVE, supra note 23, at § 2.1(d) n.127 (citing JM Junker, The
Structure of the Fourth Amendment Scope of the Protection, 79 J. CRIM. L. & C. 1105, 1125-26
(1989)) (stating “What is remarkable, however, is how little has changed byKatz’s abandonment
of the ‘trespass’ standard ofOlmstead v. United States.”); Das, supra note 20, at 214.
60 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. See LAFAVE, supra note 23 at § 2.1(b) (stating that
subsequent Supreme Court cases since Olmstead eroded its holding thereby expanding
Fourth Amendment protections); Das, supra note 20, at 214.
61 Katz, 389 U.S. at 370 (Black, J., dissenting). See LAFAVE, supra note 23 at
§ 2.1(d) at n.127; Das, supra note 20, at 214.
62 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348; Das, supra note 20, at 214.
63 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348; Das, supra note 20, at 214.
64 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-49; Das, supra note 20, at 214.
65 Katz, 389U.S. at 353;LAFAVE, supranote 23at § 2.1(b);Das, supranote 20, at 214.
66 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353; Das, supra note 20, at 214.
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achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth
can have no constitutional significance,” thereby destroying the
trespass doctrine that the FourthAmendment only “constitutionally
protected places.”67 Finally, Justice Stewart stated that Fourth
Amendment
considerations do not vanish when the search in question is transferred
from the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of a telephone
booth. Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain
free fromunreasonable searches and seizures. Thegovernment agents here
ignored “the procedure of antecedent justification that is central to the
Fourth Amendment,” a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional
precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case.68
Katz is considered the foundation modern Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that provides privacy protections to a
person from the government.69 However, the rule from Katz to
determine Fourth Amendment protections does not come from
Justice Stewart’s majority opinion but from Justice John Marshall
Harlan’s concurring opinion.70 Justice Harlan concurrence stated
that “[m]y understanding of the rule . . . is that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a personhave exhibited anactual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”71 Justice Harlan
concluded:
[t]hus aman’s home is, formost purposes, a placewhere he expects privacy,
but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the “plain view” of
outsiders are not “protected” because no intention to keep them to himself
has been exhibited.72 On the other hand, conversations in the open would
not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy
under the circumstances would be unreasonable.73
Thus, Katz is the basis of modern Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.74 It provides that a person has a privacy protections
67 Katz, 389U.S. at 353; seeLAFAVE, supranote 23at §2.1(b);Das, supranote20, at 214.
68 Katz, 389 U.S. at 359; see LAFAVE, supra note 23 at § 2.1(b) (stating “[t]he
Court then proceeded to hold that the electronic eavesdropping, although apparently
undertaken upon a ‘strong probability’ that Katz was using the telephone in violation of
federal law, was an unconstitutional search because the agents had not first obtained a
warrant”). Das, supra note 20, at 214.
69 SeeKyllo v. United States, 533U.S. 27, 32–33 (2001); Das, supra note 20, at 215.
70 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33. LAFAVE, supra note 23 at § 2.1(b) (stating “[i]n his
concurring opinion inKatz, JusticeHarlan indicated that he ‘join[ed] the opinion of theCourt,’
but then explained what he took that opinion to mean. Because lower courts attempting to
interpret and apply Katz quickly came to rely upon the Harlan elaboration, as ultimately did
a majority of the Supreme Court . . . ”); Das, supra note 20, at 215.
71 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; Das, supra note 20, at 215.
72 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; Das, supra note 20, at 215.
73 Katz, 389U.S. at 361;LAFAVE, supranote 23at § 2.1(b);Das, supranote 20, at 215.
74 See Kyllo, 533U.S. at 32–33;Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497; Das, supra note 20, at 215.
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over their possessions, however intangible (e.g. voice conversations,
electronic data, etc.) according to the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy test.75 Based on the Katz requirement, if there is a privacy
interest in a person’s possession, then any reasonable search by the
government requires a search warrant based on probable cause.76
B. Border Search Exception Doctrine Jurisprudence
During the twentieth century, the border search
exception doctrine evolved in conjunction with general Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence (i.e., Olmstead to Katz).77 The border
search exception doctrine was first mentioned in the dicta of
Carroll v. United States.78 In that case, law enforcement officers
conducted a vehicle stop on driver George Carroll and searched
his vehicle for liquor (which was illegal during Prohibition) in
interior Michigan, nowhere near an international border.79
As in Olmstead, Chief Justice Taft wrote the opinion of the
Court.80 He opined that although the warrantless search of the
automobile took place in interior Michigan, nowhere near an
international border, there are several exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment requirement of obtaining a warrant.81 In his dicta,
Chief Justice Taft stated such exceptions include not only a vehicle
stop, but also a border search.82 Hewent on to state that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect a person fromany and all warrantless
searches but only from unreasonablewarrantless searches.83Based
on this rationale, Chief Justice Taft surmised that it would be
reasonable for a law enforcement officer to stop and search a
vehicle without a warrant because a vehicle could flee the
jurisdiction prior to obtaining a warrant.84 Therefore, he held that
it was constitutional for a law enforcement officer to stop and
search a suspect’s vehicle without a warrant if she or he had
probable cause to do so.85
75 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32–33; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497;
LAFAVE, supra note 23 at § 2.1(b); Das, supra note 20, at 215.
76 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; Das, supra note 20, at 215.
77 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at n.13;United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878
(1975);Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539–40; Das, supra note 20, at 216.
78 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154; LAFAVE, supra note 23, at § 10.5(a) (stating that “the
United States Supreme Court did not have occasion to pass directly upon the question of
whether routine searches of persons or things entering the country are permissible under
the Fourth Amendment” until Carroll v. United States); Das, supra note 20, at 216.
79 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 134–36; Das, supra note 20, at 216
80 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 134–36; Das, supra note 20, at 216
81 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153–54; Das, supra note 20, at 216.
82 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153–54; Das, supra note 20, at 216–17.
83 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162; Das, supra note 20, at 217.
84 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153–54; Das, supra note 20, at 217.
85 Id. at 162; LAFAVE, supra note 23; Das, supra note 20, at 217.
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As a result, Chief Justice Taft established the border
search exception to the Fourth Amendment as “[t]ravelers may
be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of
national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the
country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his
belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.”86
Moreover, he stated that “[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be
construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which
will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights
of individual citizens.”87 Therefore, the border search exception
doctrine was founded upon the rationale that the public interest,
which was to determine whether a person can legally enter the
United States or whether the person’s possessions included
contraband, outweighed the person’s individual privacy rights.88
However, any further border search could be unreasonable
without a warrant, as indicated in future U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence.89 In Carroll, the Court was cognizant, at least
implicitly, that the scope of a warrantless border search beyond
the limits held in this case may infringe on other freedoms of
U.S. citizens as it did with Bikkannavar.
Justice Rehnquist refined the border search exception
doctrine in United States v. Ramsey.90 In this 1977 case, CBP
officials justified their warrantless search of envelopes sent in
the mail carrying narcotics based on the border search exception
doctrine.91 CBP officials’ suspicions were raised when they found
the envelopes were heavier than usual that they originated from
Thailand, which was a known source for importing drugs.92
Justice Rehnquist refined the border search exception by
stating “[t]hat searches made at the border, pursuant to the
long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping
and examining people and their property crossing into this
country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they
occur at the border.”93 Citing Carroll, he stated that “[i]t would
be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were
86 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154; LAFAVE, supra note 23 (stating that border search
since the adoption of the Fourth Amendment have been considered “reasonable” by the
fact that the person or item in question had entered into the country from outside); Das,
supra note 20, at 217.
87 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149; Das, supra note 20, at 217.
88 Id. at 153–54; Kerr, supra note 16, at 319; Das, supra note 20, at 217.
89 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at n.13.
90 Id. at 617–18; Das, supra note 20, at 217.
91 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 609–10; Das, supra note 20, at 217.
92 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 609–10; Das, supra note 20, at 217.
93 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616; Das, supra note 20, at 217.
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authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding
liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways
to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.”94 In
addition, Justice Rehnquist reinforced the notion that the border
search exception doctrine allows a warrantless search of a
person and their belongings to ascertain whether the person can
legally enter the United States and whether they carry
contraband.95 Justice Rehnquist went further to find that there
is no requirement for probable cause for a border search.96
Buried in a footnote, however, Justice Rehnquist stated
that “[w]e do not decide whether, and under what circumstances,
a border search might be deemed ‘unreasonable’ because of the
particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out.”97 This
footnote acknowledged the limits to warrantless border searches
under the border search exception doctrine,98 but provided no
further guidance. This shows that even Justice Rehnquist
believed that some warrantless border searches may be an
unconstitutional government intrusion to constitutional
protected rights of people entering the country.99 The lack of
guidance has been seized, however, by the DHS and CBP
officials to broaden the purview of warrantless border searches,
as they did with Bikkannavar,100 to include searching social
media accessible through a citizen’s mobile device, thereby
infringing the freedoms of association and anonymity, resulting
in the chilling of political speech on social media.
One particularly invasive search and seizure case
justified under the border search exception doctrine was in
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez.101 A cursory review of
case may suggest a broadening of scope for the border search
exception doctrine,102 but on deeper review it shows that the
conducted search was within conventional scope.103 In this 1985
case, CBP officials at Los Angeles International Airport
suspected Montoya de Hernandez of smuggling narcotics in her
94 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618; Das, supra note 20, at 218.
95 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 617–18; Das, supra note 20, at 218.
96 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 617–18; LAFAVE, supra note 23 (stating “[t]he lower courts
have consistently held, both before and after Ramsey, that routine searches of persons and
things may be made upon their entry into the country”); Das, supra note 20, at 218.
97 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at n.13; Das, supra note 20, at 218.
98 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at n.13; Das, supra note 20, at 218.
99 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at n.13. This includes warrantless border searches of people
that may not be U.S. Citizens. Das, supra note 20, at 218.
100 See supra Part I.
101 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 531; Das, supra note 20, at 219.
102 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539; Das, supra note 20, at 219.
103 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540–41; Das, supra note 20, at 219.
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alimentary canal.104 A further search revealed she was wearing
a girdle and elastic underpants lined with paper towels that
raised further suspicion of the scheme.105 Consequently, CBP
officials held Montoya de Hernandez for sixteen hours to obtain
a warrant to conduct a rectal search.106 The search revealed that
Montoya de Hernandez was indeed smuggling drugs in her
alimentary canal.107
Justice Rehnquist found that the border search exception
doctrine “[b]alanced against the sovereign’s interests at the
border [and] the Fourth Amendment rights of respondent.”108
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist stated,
respondent was entitled to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure.109 But not only is the expectation of privacy less at the border
than in the interior, the Fourth Amendment balance between the
interests of the Government and the privacy right of the individual is
also struck much more favorably to the Government at the border.110
This led Justice Rehnquist to hold “that the detention of a traveler
at the border, beyond the scope of a routine customs search and
inspection, is justified at its inception if customs agents,
considering all the facts surrounding the traveler and her trip,
reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in
her alimentary canal.”111 Although this case was an example of an
invasive warrantless search, it was in the traditional scope of the
border search exception doctrine for ascertaining whether a person
is carrying contraband into the United States.112
In contrast, Justice Brennan excoriated Justice Rehnquist
in his dissent by analyzingMontoya deHernandez through the lens
of Carroll, Ramsey, and the Fourth Amendment privacy
protections described inKatz,113 stating that the search and seizure
of Montoya de Hernandez were not that of democratic
104 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 533; LAFAVE, supra note 23 at § 10.5(b);
Das, supra note 20, at 219.
105 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 534; Das, supra note 20, at 219.
106 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 535; Das, supra note 20, at 219.
107 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 536; LAFAVE, supra note 23 at § 10.5(b);
Das, supra note 20, at 219.
108 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539; Das, supra note 20, at 219.
109 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539; Das, supra note 20, at 219.
110 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539–40 (internal citation omitted); Das,
supra note 20, at 219.
111 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541; LAFAVE, supra note 23 at § 10.5(b);
Das, supra note 20, at 220.
112 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541–42; Das, supra note 20, at 220.
113 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 553 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154; Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n.13; Katz, 389 U.S. at 350; Das, supra
note 20, at 220.
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government.114 Justice Brennan advocated that such an invasive
search should only be conducted after obtaining a warrant.115 Such
a holding would balance the country’s national security concerns
with the individual’s privacy protections.116 Otherwise, Justice
Brennan was afraid that law enforcement officers, motivated by
self-interest, may illegally search and seize people at the border.117
Specifically, the border search exception was born from
Carroll, which allowed a warrantless border search of a person to
determine their legal status to enter the United States, and
whether their possessions contain any contraband;118 despite this,
Ramsey found that there may be certain limits to warrantless
searches at the border if the search is found to be particularly
offensive and Katz provides guidance on what are these limits.119
Justice Brennan may have feared that a warrantless
border search invades the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens
returning to the country, as with Bikkannavar.120 This
buttresses the notion that the warrantless border search of data
accessible from a mobile device is a government intrusion upon
the rights of freedom of association and the freedom to be
anonymous. Such government intrusion is not narrowly tailored
to the compelling government interest of national security, the
consequence of which chills political speech on social media
when CBP officials use the border search exception doctrine to
conduct a warrantless border search of mobile device data.121
Thus, as indicated by Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
border search exception doctrine only allows for law enforcement
officials at the border to conduct a warrantless border search to
ascertain whether a person can legally enter the United States
or whether the person is carrying contraband.122 CBP officials,
however, have expanded the border search exception doctrine to
include warrantless border searches of mobile device data, as in
the case of Bikkannavar. Such a warrantless border search is an
114 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 546–50; Das, supra note 20, at 220.
115 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S at 552; LAFAVE, supra note 23 at § 10.5(b)
(stating that the silence of the majority on whether such a search in Montoya de
Hernandez requires a warrant is particularly significant); Das, supra note 20, at 220.
116 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541, 567. This includes a person who
may not be a U.S. citizen. Das, supra note 20, at 220.
117 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 553; Das, supra note 20, at 220.
118 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154.
119 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
120 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 553–54 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n.13; see supra Part I.
121 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014; Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement
of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Com’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995); Strandburg, supra note 1, at 748; Swire, supra note 1.
122 See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153–54; see also Kerr, supra note 16, at 294–95.
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unconstitutional government intrusion upon the constitutional
rights of United States citizens re-entering the country, which,
for the reasons stated in the next Parts, includes the freedom of
association and the freedom to be anonymous, ultimately stifling
political speech on social media.123
III. U.S. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION
The landmark U.S. Supreme Court case for freedom of
association under the First Amendment is NAACP v. Alabama.124
This 1958 case dealt with a qualifying state statute that required
an out-of-state corporation, unless exempt, to file its corporate
charter with the Secretary of State and designate a place of
business and an agent to serve process.125 The Attorney General
of Alabama filed suit against the NAACP for failing to comply
with the qualifying statute.126 The NAACP admitted to non-
compliance, believing that non-profit corporations, such as
themselves, were exempt from the qualifying statute.127 During
the course of the suit, the state of Alabama moved for, and the
court ordered, the production of membership lists by the NAACP
to the state.128 The NAACP refused to comply with the production
order based on the argument that it violated the First
Amendment rights of its members.129 The court held the NAACP
in contempt and imposed a one hundred thousand dollar fine.130
NAACP appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.131
Justice Harlan delivered the majority opinion for the
Court and found that the production order “trespasse[d] upon
fundamental freedoms protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth,” and the First Amendment.132 Further, Justice
Harlan stated “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably
enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once
recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the
123 See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153–54; Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; Ramsey, 431 U.S. at
618, n.13; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460–61; McIntyre, 514 U.S. at
347; Strandburg, supra note 1, at 748; Swire, supra note 1, at 1371.
124 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 449.
125 Id. at 451.
126 Id. at 452.
127 Id. at 451–53.
128 Id. at 453.
129 Id. at 453–54, 460.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 460.
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freedoms of speech and assembly.”133 Justice Harlan proceeded to
state that “[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom
of speech.”134 Moreover, Justice Harlan found that that the
freedom of association was indispensable, especially in situations
in which the group expresses dissident beliefs.135 Also, Justice
Harlan opined that revealing the identity of members may risk
the members’ well-being through economic, financial, physical,
political, and public retribution.136 The Court found that the state
interest for government intrusion was simply to determine
whether the NAACP conducted intrastate business in violation of
the qualifying state statute.137 Justice Harlan held that such a
state interest was not compelling enough to justify infringing on
the NAACP members’ freedom of association.138 Thus, in NAACP
v. Alabama, the freedom of association was born as well as the
idea that any government intrusion upon this right must be
viewed with strict scrutiny.139 As described in this essay, the
freedom of association can extend to informal social networks as
those within social media. Thus, as applied to technology today,
an infringement upon the freedom of association by revealing the
association of a person to a particular social media group risk
economic or political reprisal, the actions of which the freedom of
association protects.140
The freedom of association was further entrenched as a
constitutional right in the 1982 U.S. Supreme Court case Brown v.
Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Committee.141 The case dealt with
disclosure requirements contained in an Ohio statute that
compelled every political party, including a minor political party
such as the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), to report the names
and addresses of campaign contributors and recipients of campaign
disbursements.142 The SWP filed a class action challenging the
constitutionality of the disclosure requirements.143 The federal
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.
136 Id.; see also RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, A TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – SUBSTANCE& PROCEDURE § 20.41(a) (2017).
137 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 464.
138 Id. at 464–66.
139 Id. at 466.
140 See Stein, supra note 10. See Toor, supra note 10.
141 Brownv.SocialistWorkers ‘74CampaignComm. (Ohio), 459U.S. 87,91–92 (1982).
142 Id. at 88.
143 Id. at 89.
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district court found the disclosure requirements unconstitutional
but the decision was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.144
Justice Marshall delivered the majority opinion for the
Court145 and found that “[t]he Constitution protects against the
compelled disclosure of political associations and beliefs. Such
disclosures ‘can seriously infringe on the privacy association and
belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.’”146 In addition, Justice
Marshall stated that theOhio statute is subject to exacting scrutiny,
which requires that the statue must have a “substantial relation
between the information sought and [an] overriding and compelling
state interest.”147 Furthermore, the Court found “three government
interests sufficient in general to justify requiring disclosure of
information concerning campaign contributions and
expenditures: enhancement of voters’ knowledge about a candidate’s
possible allegiances and interests, deterrence of corruption, and the
enforcement of contribution limitations.”148 These sufficient
government interests were found to be requirements for major
political parties rather than for minor political parties such as
SWP.149 With the irrelevant government interest, Justice Marshall
found that the disclosure requirements were unconstitutional.150
That is, the Court held that for minor political parties, the freedom
of association not only applies to campaign contributors, but also the
recipients of the campaign disbursements.151
The Court also found that “[t]he First Amendment
prohibit[ed] a state from compelling disclosures by a minor party”
if there is a “reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or
reprisals.”152 Thus, since the government intrusion was not
substantially related to a compelling government interest, the
Court found the Ohio statute unconstitutional.153 The Court’s
finding of threats, harassments, and reprisals in the context of
Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Committee can be applied to the
social media context. Revelation of a person’s association to an
144 Id. at 90.
145 Id. at 88.
146 Id. at 91 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976)).
147 Id. at 92 (quoting Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546
(1963) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
148 Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60–74 (1976) (footnotes omitted)).
149 Id. at 95
150 Id. at 95–98.
151 Id. at 97–98.
152 Id. at 101; Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 462 (1958); Strandburg, supra note 1, at 790.
153 Brown, 459 U.S. at 101–02. Note, that in this case, a less than strict scrutiny
is used due to the electoral context of the intruding government regulating statute. See
id. at 92–95 (1982). However, in other contexts, any government intrusion to the freedom
of association is subject to strict scrutiny. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461; Strandburg, supra
note 1; Swire, supra note 1, at 1387.
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unpopular social media group, especially with a political
affiliation would subject the person to economic or political
retribution. Thus, an infringement of the freedom of association
can chill a person from joining such a social media group.
In the 2000 case Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, James Dale
sued the Boy Scouts of America for revoking his membership based
on his homosexuality, asserting that it was in violation of New
Jersey’s public accommodation law,154 which stated that
“discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public
accommodation” is prohibited.155 In their reasons for revoking
James Dale’s membership, the Boy Scouts argued that
homosexuality was against their values.156 According to the Boy
Scouts, the case was framed asNewJersey’s public accommodation
law representing an unconstitutional government intrusion upon
the group’s freedom of association.157
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion of
the Court158 and found that the First Amendment provides the
right to associate with others to pursue a common political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural views.159 In
addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that that the freedom of
association also includes the freedom not to associate.160
Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that the government
cannot be one which attempts to regulate the internal affairs of a
group by trying to force the group to accept a member they do not
desire.161 In this case, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the
compelling state interest was prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation.162 The Court found, however, that determining
whether the public accommodation law was narrowly tailored to
a compelling state interest was not the proper context for this
case.163 Further, the Court contemplated whether James Dale
could be admitted into the Boy Scouts of America or not.164 The
Court suggested that the proper framework to analyze the public
accommodation law was whether the admission of James Dale
would be a significant burden on the Boy Scouts of America
expression that homosexuality is an immoral way of life.165 In the
154 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644–45 (2000).
155 Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4–10:5-5 (West Supp. 2000)).
156 Id. at 643, 651.
157 Id. at 659.
158 Id. at 643.
159 Id. at 647 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)).
160 Id. at 648 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
161 Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
162 Id. at 657.
163 Id. at 659.
164 Id.
165 Id.
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framework of this judicial analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist held
that the “First Amendment prohibits the State from imposing”
forced admission of a homosexual member into the Boy Scouts of
America through its public accommodation law.166 Thus, in view
of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, any government intrusion
upon the freedom of association must be narrowly tailored to a
compelling government interest, even when the compelling
interest is an interest as serious as preventing discrimination.167
The freedom of association can and should be applied to
social media groups because being a member of a social media
group can be a form of expression protected by the First
Amendment in view of the above Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Thus, any government intrusion, such as revealing whether a
person is a member of such a social media group, would infringe
upon the freedom of association. A warrantless border search of
mobile device data is a government intrusion that would infringe
upon the freedom of association on social media resulting in
suppressing people from associating themselves with any
political social media group, formal or informal, for fear of
political retribution.
IV. U.S. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON FREEDOM TO
BE ANONYMOUS
The landmark case regarding the freedom to be anonymous
is McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,168 which concerned “an
Ohio statute . . . prohibit[ing] the distribution of anonymous
campaign literature.”169 In 1988, a school district official found out
that Margaret McIntyre anonymously distributed pamphlets
opposing a local tax levy170 and filed a complaint against her with
the Ohio Elections Commission.171 As a result, the Ohio Elections
Commission fined Margaret McIntyre one hundred dollars in
accordance with the Ohio statute.172
Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the majority opinion
of the Court173 and held that the First Amendment not only
protects the freedom to publish creative literature anonymously,
166 Id.; see also ROTUNDA&NOWAK, supra note 136, at § 20.41(d).
167 Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 645, 658–60; Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of
Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958); Strandburg, supra note 1; Swire, supra
note 1, at 1387.
168 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Com’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
169 Id. at 336.
170 Id. at 337.
171 Id. at 338.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 336.
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but also protects the freedom to publish political literature.174 In
addition, Justice Stevens stated that a person expresses political
speech anonymously to protect themselves from reprisal and a
law that reveals a person’s identity destroying their anonymity
burdens political speech; such a law that burdens political
speech should be subject to at least exacting scrutiny to
determine whether the law is narrowly tailored to a state
interest.175 The state of Ohio argued that it had two compelling
interests for the statute: (1) “preventing fraudulent or libelous
statements”; and (2) “providing the electorate with relevant
information” (i.e. informed electorate).176 Justice Stevens held
that “[a]nonymity is a shield from tyranny of the majority”177 and
that “society accords greater weight to the value of free speech
than to the dangers of its misuse.”178 Thus, the Court held that
the Ohio statute was an unconstitutional government intrusion
upon the freedom to be anonymous because it was not narrowly
tailored to serve the Ohio’s asserted compelling interest.179
Moreover, the freedom anonymity can extend to the warrantless
border search of mobile device data including social media.180
Government inspection of a person’s social media destroys their
anonymity and chills subsequent political speech for that person
in particular and for the populous as a whole.181
Similarly, in the 2002 case of Watchtower Bible and Tract
Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, the Court dealt with
a religious group seeking an injunction of a village ordinance
requiring door-to-door advocates to register with the mayor in order
to receive a permit to canvass neighborhoods in the village.182 The
religious group argued that the village ordinance violated their First
Amendment rights such as the freedom to exercise religion, freedom
of speech, and freedom of press.183 The Court granted certiorari to
answer the legal question of whether the ordinance violated the
First Amendment protection to anonymously provide pamphlets
174 Id. at 342–43.
175 Id. at 347–48.
176 Id. at 348.
177 Id. at 357.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 See Duggan, supra note 10, which states that fourteen percent of people
surveyed in a Pew Research study were harassed on social media due to their political
views implying that anonymity in expressing political speech would be valued by a
significant portion of American society, especially anonymity from government officials.
181 Id. If people know that the government can inspect their social media, through
a warrantless border search, thereby destroying their anonymity, they will more likely not
express their political views.
182 Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150, 153 (2002).
183 Id. at 153–54.
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and discourse door-to-door.184 The Court examined the alleged
violation of the freedom to be anonymous,mentioning that therewas
some evidence that the mayor had shown hostility toward the
religious group.185 In conjunction with evidence of the hostility
shown from the mayor, other evidence pointed to the fact that the
religious group was concerned about political retribution from the
mayor if they had to register for a permit and reveal their identity.186
In delivering the majority opinion for the Court,187 Justice
Stevens debated the level of scrutiny to apply to the village
ordinance and ultimately settled on strict scrutiny.188 The village
stated the ordinance addressed several compelling interests,
including prevention of fraud, crime, and protection of residents’
privacy.189 Justice Stevens found that the village ordinance
covered a wide range of free speech that included political
speech, religious speech, and commercial speech.190 Further, the
Justice stated that if prevention of fraud was a compelling
interest, then the village ordinance would only cover commercial
speech and no other types of speech.191 Indeed, the Court found
that it was unlikely that requiring a permit would deter
criminals to canvass door-to-door192 because criminals commit
crimes with or without the village ordinance, such as use some
other pretext instead of canvassing, to knock on the door of a
residence to commit a crime.193
Thus, Justice Stevens found that the village ordinance
was too broad. Not only did it try to address the criminal and
privacy concerns, but it also burdened religious and political
speech. With respect to residential privacy, Justice Stevens
stated that a resident could simply refuse to engage with a door-
to-door canvasser if she or he did not want to listen to the
canvasser.194 Therefore, the Court held that the village ordinance
was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest, and therefore unconstitutionally intruded upon the
freedom to be anonymous.195 Lastly, and most importantly, the
Court stated that the freedom to be anonymous is crucial to the
country’s political discourse and functioning as a democracy, and
184 Id. at 160.
185 Id. at 158.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 153.
188 Id. at 164, 168.
189 Id. at 164–65.
190 Id. at 165.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 169.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 168.
195 Id.
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any governmental intrusion upon this freedom must be subject
to strict scrutiny.196
In view of the above Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
freedom of anonymity can and should be applied to users of social
media. Any government intrusion that reveals the identity of a
social media user expressing political speech would infringe upon
the freedom of anonymity. A warrantless border search of mobile
device data is such a government intrusion because it would
infringe upon the freedom to be anonymous on social media,
ultimately silencing people from expressing their political beliefs
for fear of political or government reprisal.
V. U.S. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION AND FREEDOM TO BE ANONYMOUS APPLIES
TO SOCIALMEDIA
A. Freedom of Association Applies to Social Media
Although the freedom of association applies to groups
that have formal relationships between the group governing
body and its members, such as social activist groups, political
parties, and service groups, the freedom of association can also
apply to informal groups as well.197 A person’s informal
relationships, such as social and professional circles, are
associations that are protected by the freedom of association.198
Government interference of such personal relationships would
chill the populous as each person would be looking over their
shoulder to see whether government surveillance would catch
them in an intimate, associational relationship, which is
antithetical to the ideology of democratic government.199 For
example, organizing a protest for a social cause opposing a
government policy by an informal group should be protected
from government intrusion under the freedom of association.200
Today, people use social media as a tool to organize into
formal and informal groups for a specific common political,
196 Id. at 167–68.
197 Swire, supra note 1, at 1377 (“Social networks serve as platforms for what
freedom of association doctrine calls ‘expressive’ associations, such as political groups,
religious organizations, and other groups in civil society.”). Further, Swire points out that
social media were crucial in the “Arab Spring” political movement in the Middle East and
Africa as well as the grassroots movement during President Obama’s campaign. Id. at
1379; see also Strandburg, supra note 1, at 804–05 (stating that expressive association of
informal social networks can be protected under the freedom of association).
198 See Swire, supra note 1, at 1377; Strandburg, supra note 1, at 804–05.
199 See Strandburg, supra note 1, at 745; Toor, supra note 10, at 323.
200 Swire, supra note 1, at 1377, 1379.
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economic, social, religious, professional, or creative cause.201 In
addition, people use social media to express their individual
political and social views as part larger collective voice.202 The
freedom of association protects all of this speech from government
intrusion under the First Amendment.203
Although peoplemay share even an informalmembership in
a socialmedia groupwith friends, a socialmedia platform, and other
third parties, these same people would not want to disclose such an
informal membership into the social media group to the
government.204 Further, disclosure to the government of one’s
informal membership to a social media group instills a fear of
retribution, however slight, by the government.205 Such fear chills
the person from organizing herself into certain social media groups
and expressing certain political speech on social media.206 This
political chilling effect is antithetical to the First Amendment rights
of the country’s values and also undermines political discourse,
which is part of the foundation of the nation’s democracy.207
B. Freedom to Be Anonymous Applies to Social Media
Sometimes people wish to remain anonymous when using
social media.208 In this regard, being anonymous does not
necessarily mean people wish to hide their identity from everyone
all the time.209 Instead, it may mean hiding their identity from a
particular entity, such as hackers, government, employer, or
advertisers, for a period of time.210As a recent PewResearch study
201 Strandburg, supra note 1, at 801; Swire, supra note 1, at 1377.
202 Toor, supra note 10, at 288–93; Swire, supra note 1, at 1377–79.
203 Strandburg, supra note 1, at 801–05; Toor, supra note 10, at 293; Swire,
supra note 1, at 1380, 1396, 1415; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 466.
204 Strandburg, supra note 1, at 804–05; Toor, supra note 10, at 293; Swire,
supra note 1, at 1406.
205 Strandburg, supra note 1, at 804–05; Toor, supra note 10, at 297; Stein,
supra note 10, at 1275.
206 Strandburg, supra note 1, at 805; Stein, supra note 10, 1274–75.
207 Toor, supra note 10, at 312–13; Stein, supra note 10, at 1256.
208 Fernando L. Diaz, Trolling & the First Amendment: Protecting Internet
Speech in the Era of Cyberbullies & Internet Defamation, U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 135,
147 (2016); Daegon Cho & Soodong Kim, Empirical Analysis of Online Anonymity and
User Behaviors: the Impact of Real Name Policy, 2012 45th Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences 3041, 3046–47 (comparing the quantity of social media
postings before and after the Real Name Verification Law in South Korea was enacted.
The study found a significant decrease of social media postings after the law was enacted
that eliminated anonymity on the Internet for South Koreans.).
209 Strandburg, supra note 1, at 745–46. Although people form online social
groups in which members of groups are known to each other, the members of these
groups may still want to be anonymous with respect to the government.
210 Lee Rainie et al., Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, PEW RES. CTR.
(Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/05/anonymity-privacy-and-security-
online/ [https://perma.cc/4SZY-9BJH].
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shows, eighty-six percent of adult internet users perform some
function to reduce their visibility to some entity.211 In addition, the
Pew Research study shows people try to hide their identity the
most from hackers, but only five percent hide their identity from
the government.212 However, as it becomes more known that the
government may surveil online social groups to a certain extent,
members of these online social media groups may want to hide
their identity from the government.213
Moreover, a recent study of the effect of a South Korean
law requiring real name identification online and criminalizing
anonymity for its residents shows a substantial effect on
behavior.214A significant number of participants in the studywere
shown to have marked decline in uninhibited behaviors after the
law came into effect and were more discreet in their online
behavior.215 Thus, this indicates that if there was such a U.S.
government intrusion upon the freedom to be anonymous by
surveilling people’s social media, it would suppress their political
speech on social media, thereby crumbling the marketplace of
political ideas, which is lifeblood to any democracy.216
C. Recent U.S. Supreme Court Cases Regarding the
Constitutional Privacy Protections of Mobile Device Data
Bolster the Freedom of Association and Freedom to be
Anonymous on Social Media
Although there has been no U.S. Supreme Court case
dealing with the freedom of association and the freedom to be
anonymous regarding mobile devices and social media accounts,
the Court has dealt with the warrantless search of mobile
devices in other contexts.217
In Riley v. California, a 2014 case dealing with the search
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement under the
Fourth Amendment rather than the border search exception
doctrine, police officers conducted a vehicle stop on David Leon
Riley’s vehicle for expired registration tags.218 During the vehicle
stop, the police officers discovered that Riley was driving with a
211 Id. at 4.
212 Id. at 5.
213 Cho & Kim, supra note 208; Strandburg, supra note 1, at 745–46.
214 Cho & Kim, supra note 208, at 3046–47.
215 Id.
216 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357; Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, 536 U.S. at
165–66; Froomkin, supra note 5, at 145.
217 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–81.
218 Id. at 2480; Das, supra note 20, at 230.
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suspended license.219 As a matter of routine, Riley’s vehicle was
impounded;220 additionally, while conducting an inventory search,
police officers found two concealed firearms in the vehicle.221 This
led to Riley’s arrest for possession of concealed firearms.222
Incident to arrest, the police seized a mobile phone as well as
personal items that revealed Riley was amember of a gang.223 The
police officers went a step further by searching the contents of the
mobile phone discovering images of Riley near a car involved in a
shooting a few weeks earlier.224 As a result, Riley was charged
with the shooting.225 During his legal proceedings, Riley moved to
suppress the evidence discovered on his mobile phone by the
police officers on the basis that it was a warrantless search out of
scope of the search incident to arrest exception.226
Chief Justice John Roberts, in his majority opinion that
stated the scope of a warrantless search incident to arrest is to
remove any weapons that pose a threat to law enforcement while
apprehending the suspect (be it in an automobile, residence, or
in public) and avoid destruction of evidence.227 Further, he found
“we generally determine whether to exempt a given type of
search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”228 Thus,
the Court found that the government intrusion of a warrantless
search of mobile device data incident to an arrest is subject to
strict scrutiny.229
In addition, Chief Justice Roberts justified the scope of
the search incident to arrest exception by its historical
foundation,230 resulting in a finding that “[d]igital data stored on
a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an
arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape.”231 Indeed,
law enforcement officers can conduct a warrantless search of the
mobile phone incident to arrest to determine whether it is
219 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–81; Das, supra note 20, at 230.
220 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–81; Das, supra note 20, at 230.
221 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–81; Das, supra note 20, at 230.
222 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–81; Das, supra note 20, at 230.
223 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–81; Das, supra note 20, at 230.
224 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–81; Das, supra note 20, at 230.
225 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481; Das, supra note 20, at 230.
226 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481; Das, supra note 20, at 230.
227 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at. at 2482, 2485; Das, supra note 20, at 230.
228 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484; Das, supra note 20, at 230.
229 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267,
1280–81 (June 2007); Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.
230 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2483–84; Das, supra note 20, at 230.
231 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485; Das, supra note 20, at 230.
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disguising any weapons; (e.g., a bomb may be hidden within the
mobile phone)232 however, once it is determined that the mobile
phone is not hiding any weapons, any further search of the
mobile phone is out of scope of the search incident to arrest
exception.233 Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts addressed the
destruction of evidence aspect of the search incident to arrest by
stating “once law enforcement officers have secured a cell phone,
there is no longer any risk that the arrestee himself will be able
to delete incriminating data from the phone.”234
Thus, the purpose of the search incident to arrest
exception is to allow a warrantless search to protect law
enforcement officers from hidden weapons and to prevent
destroying of evidence.235 The Court held that any further
search, including the data accessible by a mobile phone, required
a search warrant based on probable cause because a mobile
phone is not simply used as telephone but can also be used as a
storage device containing details of a person’s life she or he
would like to keep private.236 Such details are ones must be given
the strongest of constitutional protection and any government
intrusion of which should be subject to strict scrutiny.237
Although Chief Roberts held that such constitutional protection
is shielded by the Fourth Amendment, the holding can be
interpreted to bolster the freedom of association and the freedom
to be anonymous on social media accessible through a mobile
device.238
This rationale from the ruling in Riley, which applies to
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement, can also be applied to any warrantless border
search under the border search exception doctrine.239 That is,
after a warrantless border search determines that a person can
legally enter the United States and carries no contraband, any
further search, including a search of a person’s mobile device
data, is warrantless government surveillance of a person’s social
media and must be subject to strict scrutiny because it is a
232 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485; Das, supra note 20, at 230.
233 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485; Das, supra note 20, at 230.
234 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486; Das, supra note 20, at 231.
235 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485–86; Das, supra note 20, at 231.
236 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95; Das, supra note 20, at 231.
237 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95.
238 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495; Strandburg, supra note 1, at 741; Swire, supra note
1, 1374–75.
239 Ramsey, 431U.S. at 621;Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95; Das, supra note 20, at 231.
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government intrusion upon the freedom of association and the
freedom to be anonymous.240
Likewise, the 2018 case Carpenter v. United States dealt
with law enforcement officials gathering location information
about Carpenter provided by his mobile phone to his cell phone
provider in Michigan and Ohio.241 Using the location information
collected from the cell phone carrier without a warrant, law
enforcement officers were able to place Carpenter at several
robberies.242 Carpenter filed a motion to suppress the location
information as violating his reasonable expectation of privacy
under the Fourth Amendment.243
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion of the Court,
holding that although Carpenter provided his location information
to the third-party, the cell phone carrier, such location information
was so intimate to his constant whereabouts that it was
constitutionally protected information and that Carpenter had a
reasonable expectation of privacy of his location information under
the Fourth Amendment.244 Thus, law enforcement officers were
required to obtain a warrant prior to gathering the location
information regarding Carpenter’s cell phone from the cell phone
carrier.245 Chief Justice Roberts found that because location
information of amobile device is so intimate, it requires the highest
level of constitutional protection.246
Applying Carpenter’s rationale to a warrantless border
search of mobile device data, a person’s social media is as
intimate as a person’s location information.247 That is, a person’s
social media can include her or his political and social views that
they would want to constitutionally shield from government
surveillance.248 Thus, a person’s social media should receive the
same level of constitutional protection as the person’s location
information.249 Such a level of constitutional protection includes
protecting a person’s social media accessible through a mobile
device from government surveillance under the freedom of
association and the freedom to be anonymous.
240 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484, 2495; Strandburg, supra
note 1, at 741; Swire, supra note 1, at 1373–74; Fallon, supra note 229, at 1280.
241 Carpenter v. United States, 138S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018); Das, supra note 20, at 231.
242 Carpenter 138 S. Ct. at 2206, 2212; Das, supra note 20, at 231.
243 Carpenter 138 S. Ct. at 2206, 2212.
244 Id. at 2211, 2220; Das, supra note 20, at 232.
245 Carpenter 138 S. Ct. at 2221; Das, supra note 20, at 232.
246 Id. at 2217.
247 Toor, supra note 10, at 313–14; Stein, supra note 10, at 1266.
248 Toor, supra note 10, at 311–13; Stein, supra note 10, at 1266–68.
249 Carpenter 138 S. Ct., at 2222–23; Toor, supra note 10, at 301; Stein, supra note 10.
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VI. WARRANTLESS BORDER SEARCH OF SOCIALMEDIA IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONALGOVERNMENT INTRUSIONUPON THE
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND TO THE FREEDOM TO BE
ANONYMOUS
Asmentioned in Part I, CPB officials subjected Bikkannavar
to a warrantless border search of his mobile device data. Although
the ACLU sued the DHS on Bikkannavar’s and the co-plaintiffs’
behalf, arguing that suchwarrantless border searches infringe upon
their First Amendment rights generally, it did not specifically state
that the warrantless border search of social media accessible
through their mobile device infringes their freedoms of association
and anonymity, chilling their political speech.250
Courts may not be aware of the extent that searches of
mobile technology and government intrusion can infringe on
such freedoms. A Pew Research study shows that seventy-seven
percent of people in the United States own a smartphone and
sixty-nine percent of the people use social media.251 Considering
the ease in which to access social media using a smartphone, it
is likely that almost all of those that use social media access it
through their smartphone.252 Any government surveillance of
social media is a government intrusion that would affect a
significant number of U.S. citizens, some of which would be
chilled in expressing any political speech on social media.253
Further, the DHS policy for a warrantless border search of
mobile device data includes a mandate to determine whether a
person entering the United States is a terrorist.254 One way in
which to determine whether a person entering the United States
has a terrorist ideology would be to conduct a warrantless border
search of social media accessible through their mobile device.255
Such government surveillance is also a government intrusion
upon the freedom to associate into social media groups as well
250 See supra Part I.
251 JACOB POUSHTER, CALDWELL BISHOP, & HANYU CHWE, PEW RES. CTR. SOCIAL
MEDIAUSECONTINUESTORISE INDEVELOPINGCOUNTRIESBUTPLATEAUSACROSSDEVELOPED
ONES 14, 16 (2018), http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/06/19/social-media-use-continues-to-rise-in-
developing-countries-but-plateaus-across-developed-ones/ [https://perma.cc/2MRA-5P4H].
252 Toor, supra note 10, at 314; Stein, supra note 10, 1255–56; POUSHTER,
BISHOP, & CHWE, supra note 251.
253 See generally Toor, supra note 10; Stein, supra note 10; POUSHTER, BISHOP,
& CHWE, supra note 241; Allen, supra note 1; Strandburg, supra note 1. Swire, supra
note 1; Martin & Fargo, supra note 5; Froomkin, supra note 5; Fallon, supra note 229.
254 Inspection of Electronic Devices, supra note 15; Amended Complaint, supra
note 20, at 16–18.
255 Inspection of Electronic Devices, supra note 15; Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 44, at 16–18; Iraola, supra note 14.
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as being anonymous on social media, especially through a
person’s smartphone, and is subject to strict scrutiny.256
As described in this essay, the strict scrutiny analysis of a
government intrusion upon the freedoms of association and
anonymity means that it must be narrowly tailored to a
compelling government interest.257 The compelling government
interest for a warrantless border search is a matter of national
security, specifically, preventing terrorists from entering the
United States.258 Unfettered access to and search of mobile device
data, including social media content, is not a narrowly tailored
government intrusion.259 Such a government intrusion leaves a
U.S. citizen’s freedom of association and freedom to be anonymous
on social media at the whim of CBP officials as experienced by
Bikkannavar. Instead, requiring a warrant from a judicial officer
provides a balanced approach in weighing the nation security
interests of the country with the freedoms of association and
anonymity. Otherwise, such an unfettered government intrusion
can lead to tyranny and chill a person’s political speech on social
media, which goes against collective American values and hinders
the function of the nation’s democracy.260
Thus, warrantless border searches of mobile device data
must be narrowly tailored to stave off tyrannical behavior of the
government.261 One way in which to narrowly tailor the warrantless
border search ofmobile device data is to simply require CBP officials
to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a border search of mobile
device data.262 Such a process is more narrowly tailored than a
warrantless border search because an independent magistrate can
decide, ex ante, whether such a border search is constitutional.263
Having an independent magistrate decide whether the border
search is constitutional inherently culls the number of persons
whose mobile device data would be subject to a border search by
balancing the national security interests of the nation with the
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freedoms of association and anonymity of the individual.264 Since a
warrantmust be based on probable cause,265 CBP officials would not
be able to conduct border searches of mobile device data of persons
that they only reasonably suspect or have no reason to suspect to
pose a national security risk.266 Hence, the pool of potential persons
subject to border searches would shrink, thereby “narrowly
tailoring” the government intrusion of a border search into the
freedoms of association and anonymity, lessening the chilling of
political speech.267
CONCLUSION
The freedom of association and freedom to be anonymous
of the First Amendment are crucial for a democracy to function
in the United States. These rights protect people who are
organizing into groups to express protected speech, such as
political speech. Further, as technology has evolved, social
media has allowed people to organize themselves into informal
social media groups or express protected speech anonymously.
The freedom of association and the freedom to be anonymous
extends to people expressing themselves in informal social
media networks or anonymously on social media.
Recent U.S. Supreme Court cases such as Riley and
Carpenter provide constitutional protections for those using social
media through mobile devices.268 These cases held that mobile
device data that may comprise social media account information
includes intimate details of a person’s life as well as political speech
expression that should be constitutionally shielded with the
greatest of protections from the prying eyes of the government.269
This notion comports with the protection of social media accessible
through a mobile device from warrantless border searches by the
government under the freedom of association, the freedom to be
anonymous, and the Fourth Amendment.270
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Thus, as in the real world—in contrast to the cyber
world—any government intrusion upon the freedom of
association and the freedom to be anonymous in social media
groups, including warrantless border searches, is subject to
strict scrutiny. Without such a strong shield to protect these
rights, the potential government intrusion leads to a silencing of
protected speech, hindering the function of democracy. Thus, the
government intrusion on the freedom of association and freedom
to be anonymous in social media group must be narrowly
tailored to a compelling government interest.
Although the government interest of protecting national
security from terrorists is a compelling interest, a warrantless
border search is not a narrowly tailored government intrusion
for this purpose. Instead, a more narrowly tailored government
intrusion for this purpose would be obtaining a warrant to
search mobile device data. With such a balanced approach in
place, it would inherently limit the number of people subject to
a mobile device data border search, including their social media,
thereby avoiding the obvious consequence of chilling political
speech on people’s social media that comes with any government
intrusion or interference.
